We consider games with an endogenous sharing rule and provide conditions for the invariance of the equilibrium set, i.e., for the existence of a common equilibrium set for the games defined by each possible sharing rule. Applications of our results include Bertrand competition with convex costs, electoral competition, and contests.
Introduction
Consider the classical problem of a Bertrand duopoly, i.e., two firms set prices to compete for customers. A difficulty in modelling this situation is that when the firms set the same price, customers are indifferent with respect to where to buy, so that it is unclear how to specify the firms' profits (payoffs). Games with an endogenous sharing rule, introduced by Simon and Zame (1990) , avoid this difficulty by specifying players' payoffs by a correspondence rather than by a function, thus taking a broad stand on how to specify players' payoffs.
When analyzing a game with an endogenous sharing rule, one may be interested in obtaining the existence of a strategy profile that is an equilibrium for each possible sharing rule, henceforth, an invariant equilibrium. Indeed, whenever such invariant equilibrium exists, the choice of the sharing rule becomes immaterial. Specifically, the predictions provided by such invariant equilibrium are robust to the actual sharing rule that happens to occur, e.g. the actual choice made by consumers regarding which of the two duopolists to buy from.
An appealing scenario occurs when each strategy that is an equilibrium for some sharing rule is an invariant equilibrium, henceforth, when the equilibrium set is invariant. In this case, any equilibrium is robust to the actual sharing rule that happens to occur and, based on this robustness notion, there is no need to select amongst the set of equilibria. Furthermore, as pointed out by Lebrun (1996) and Jackson and Swinkels (2005) , the invariance of the equilibrium set is also important from a practical viewpoint. Indeed, it allows us to analyze the equilibrium set of the game defined by a sharing rule we may be interest in by analyzing the equilibrium set of the game defined by any other (simpler, easier to analyze) sharing rule. In particular, in the presence of incomplete information, it is often easier to establish the existence of equilibrium for some type-independent sharing rule by first showing that some type-dependent sharing rule has an equilibrium and then appeal to the invariance of the equilibrium set.
In this paper, we establish results concerning the invariance of the equilibrium set for general games with an endogenous sharing rule. Our first key condition, called "virtual continuity," roughly says that each player can, with a probability close to one, avoid points at which the payoff correspondence is multi-valued while virtually achieving the same payoff given the strategies of the other players, regardless of the particular sharing rule which is in force. We show that, under this condition, the equilibrium set coincides with the set of invariant equilibrium in the class of games defined by efficient sharing rules. More precisely, any strategy that is an equilibrium of the game defined by some sharing rule is also an equilibrium in the game defined by any efficient sharing rule. This means that for equilibrium analysis of virtually continuous games with an endogenous sharing rule, one may focus on efficient sharing rules.
In this light, our result has the interesting interpretation that, in equilibrium, indeterminacies are resolved efficiently. Moreover, as we illustrate using simple Bertrand examples, this result is also useful to compute the equilibrium set of games with an endogenous sharing rule.
Our second key condition, called "strong indeterminacy," roughly requires that indeterminacies are not fully eliminated by focusing on efficient sharing rules. More precisely, if a player has, at some action profile, more than one possible payoff, then there are at least two efficient payoff profiles at that action profile given different payoffs to that player. Our main result states that each game with an endogenous sharing rule satisfying virtual continuity and strong indeterminacy has an invariant equilibrium set. Jackson and Swinkels (2005) have established the invariance of the equilibrium set for a specific setting of private-value auctions. Our contribution is to extend this conclusion to a general framework. The generality of our approach allows us to obtain new equilibrium invariance results for Bertrand competition with convex costs (along the lines of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and Maskin (1986) ), for electoral competition (as in Duggan (2007) ) and contests (as in Moldovanu and Sela (2001) ).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we consider a simple motivating example to illustrate our results. In Section 3 we present our main results . Section 4 contains applications of our results. In Section 5 we present extensions of our results, in particular to Bayesian contexts.
A motivating example
Consider a standard Bertrand duopoly with zero costs and one commodity whose demand is d(x) = 1 − x where x is the lowest price in the market. Each of the two firms sets a price in the unit interval to attract costumers. If prices are different (i.e.
x 1 ̸ = x 2 ), then the firm setting the lowest price, firm i say, receives a profit of (1−x i )x i whereas the other firm receives a profit of zero. If x 1 = x 2 , profits are indeterminate; if θ denotes the fraction of the demand allocated to firm 1, then θ(1 − x 1 )x 1 is the profit of firm 1, and (1 − θ)(1 − x 1 )x 1 is that of firm 2; θ is allowed to take any value in [0, 1] . The situation can thus be described by an endogenous sharing rule with two players (the two firms), each having as its action set the interval [0, 1] , and with a payoff correspondence Q : [0, 1] 2 → R 2 defined by setting, for each x ∈ [0, 1] 2 ,
It turns out that the discussion of how to specify payoff in this Bertrand duopoly problem is immaterial for equilibrium analysis. Indeed, a particular way of specifying payoffs amounts to choosing a (measurable) selection of the payoff correspondence and, for any such choice, the resulting normal-form game has a unique equilibrium (both in pure and mixed strategies) where both firms set a price of zero. This is wellknown for the case of the equal-sharing rule defined by setting θ = 1/2 independently of the price vector x (see, e.g. Kaplan and Wettstein (2000) ) and it will follow from our invariance result in the general case.
3 Invariance of the equilibrium set
Preliminaries
A game Γ = (N, (X i ) i∈N , Q) with an endogenous sharing rule is defined by a finite set N of players, a compact metric space X i of actions for each i ∈ N , and an upper hemicontinuous (uhc in the sequel) payoff correspondence Q : X → R N with non-empty compact values, writing X = ∏ i∈N X i .
We write M i for the set of Borel probability measures on X i , and M = ∏ i∈N M i . Given σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) ∈ M , we write τ σ for the corresponding product measure on X. For each i ∈ N and x i ∈ X i , δ x i denotes the Dirac measure at x i . Let Γ = (N, (X i ) i∈N , Q) be an endogenous sharing rule game. We write S Q for the set of all measurable selections of Q. For each q ∈ S Q , G q = (X i , q i ) i∈N is a normal-form game. For each i ∈ N and σ ∈ M , letq i : M → R be defined by
Nash equilibrium of Gq. Let E(G q ) denote the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria of G q . From now on, we abuse notation and write
We say that σ ∈ M is an equilibrium of
We write E(Γ) for the set of all equilibria of Γ. 1 For σ ∈ E(Γ), we say that σ is an invariant equilibrium
We write I(Γ) for the set of invariant equilibria of Γ.
for each x ∈ X, and write S Q eff for the set of all selections of Q eff . Of course, S Q eff ̸ = ∅,
For each i ∈ N , write π i for the projection of R n onto the i-th copy of R. Let Q i = π i • Q and note that Q i is uhc with nonempty and compact values. Let D i be the set of action profiles at which Q i is multi-valued, i.e.,
We say that Γ = (N, (
Proof. Because Q is uhc with non-empty and compact values, there is a sequence Castaing and Valadier (1977, Corollary III.3, p. 63 and Theorem III.6, p. 65) ). Now,
For convenience of later reference, we record the following fact in form of a lemma; the lemma implies in particular that
Proof. Use Aliprantis and Border (2006, 18.2, 18.19 and 18.20) .
For each q ∈ S Q and i ∈ N , player i's value function is the function
Recall that the σ-algebra of the universally measurable subsets of X equals ∩ µ B µ , where the intersection is over all the Borel probability measures µ on X and B µ denotes the µ-completion of the Borel σ-algebra.
2 Each Borel probability measures µ on X has an unique extension to the universally measurable subsets of X, which we also denote by µ.
Proof. (a) By Lemma 2, Q eff has nonempty values; we now show that graph(Q eff )
is a Borel subset of X × R N . To see this, set A = R N and B = R N , and for each
Let H m be the projection of G m onto X × A. Because Q is uhc with compact values, G m is compact, and hence so is Castaing and Valadier (1977, Theorem III.22, p. 74) , it follows from (a) that there is a sequence ⟨q k ⟩ k∈N of universally measurable selections of Q such that
Virtual continuity
Our definition of virtual continuity is as follows. We say that an endogenous sharing
Example 1 below shows in particular that the game considered in Section 2 is virtually continuous. Example 1. Consider an endogenous sharing rule game Γ = (N, (X i ) i∈N , Q) where
, and F ⊆ X, write F x 1 and F x 2 for the sections of F at x 1 and x 2 respectively. Consider the following hypothesis. For each i = 1, 2, each ε > 0, and each
1 ) instead of (x 1 , x 2 ) if i = 2; note also that #(Q i (x)) = 1 for x ∈ X \D i , so the inequality in (ii) is defined). Then virtual continuity holds. To see this, consider any q ∈ S Q , σ ∈ M , ε > 0, and i ∈ {1, 2}. Without loss of generality, take i = 1. Using Fubini's theorem, we can find anx
, and we are done by taking δx 1 for µ 1 . Otherwise, letx be the unique point in D 1 determined byx 1 , and choose C 1 (x) corresponding to ε andx according to the hypotheses above. By (i) there is a sequence ⟨x 1,k ⟩ in
Remark 1. It should be obvious that in Example 1 one may take any compact metric spaces (which need not be the same) for X 1 and X 2 , and for ∆ any subset of X 1 × X 2 such that all sections ∆ x 1 and ∆ x 2 , x 1 ∈ X 1 , x 2 ∈ X 2 , are empty or singletons.
Verifying virtual continuity in a particular game with an endogenous sharing rule is potentially daunting as one needs to consider all possible selections of the payoff correspondence. The next result may be helpful in this regard. Define 
Proof. The "only if" part is true because for each i ∈ N there is a q ∈ S Q (which may depend on i) such that q i (x) = m i (x) for all x ∈ X (see Lemma 2). For the "if" part, let i ∈ N , q ∈ S Q , ε > 0 and σ ∈ M be given. Since X is compact and Q is uhc and takes compact values, there is a number B such that ||y|| ≤ B for all y ∈ Q(x) and x ∈ X. Let η > 0 be such that (1 + 2B)η < ε. By hypothesis,
Thus the "if" part follows.
It is important to note that if an endogenous sharing rule game Γ = (N, (
is virtually continuous, then, for every player, the value functions defined from the elements of S Q all agree.
Consider any q, q ′ ∈ S Q . Then, by virtual continuity, since q, q
where B as in the proof of Lemma 4. As ε is arbitrary,
Remark 2. Virtual continuity also implies that if M is given the narrow topology, then the value functions are continuous; see Lemma 10 in Appendix A.
Structure of the equilibrium set
The first result in this section provides a characterization of equilibria in virtually continuous games.
Let B be as in the proof of Lemma 4, and let ε > 0
contradicting the assumption that σ is an equilibrium for q. Thus τ σ (F ) = 0. It follows that for all i ∈ N , τ σ ({x ∈ X :q i (x) ̸ = q i (x)}) = 0. By Lemma 5, we conclude that σ is an equilibrium forq.
Suppose now that there is an
A simple application of Theorem 1 can be made in the context of the equilibrium existence result for endogenous sharing rule games established by Simon and Zame (1990) . Recall that in this latter result, the payoff correspondence is required to take convex values, and that an equilibrium needs to exist just for some selection which cannot be specified. In both of these aspects, Theorem 1 can be used to get an improvement if virtual continuity holds.
Proof. Define an endogenous sharing rule game
be the convex hull of Q(x) for each x ∈ X. (By Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 17.35, p. 573) , Q ′ is uhc and takes non-empty compact values, as required by our definition of a game with an endogenous sharing rule.)
Using Lemma 4, we can see that virtual continuity of Γ implies virtual continuity
. Now by Simon and Zame (1990) , E(Γ ′ ) ̸ = ∅, so by the previous paragraph and Theorem 1, E(Γ) ̸ = ∅, and in particular, E(G q ) ̸ = ∅ for every q ∈ S Q eff .
Remark 3. Instead of appealing to Simon and Zame (1990) and our invariance result Theorem 1, Theorem 2 can also be proved by using Reny (1999, Corollary 5.2) . Indeed,
give M the narrow topology. Then virtual continuity implies that, for every q ∈ S Q , the mixed extension of G q is payoff secure; see Lemma 9 in the Appendix. Moreover,
∑ i∈N r i for each x ∈ X (see Lemma 2), then the mixed extension of G q is reciprocal upper semicontinuous; see Reny (1999, Proposition 5.1). Thus Reny (1999, Corollary 5 .2) applies to such a q.
Remark 4. None of our results requires the payoff correspondence to take convex values. Actually, under our condition of virtual continuity, convexifying payoffs does not alter the equilibrium set, and also not the invariant equilibrium set. Indeed, let Γ = (N, (X i ) i∈N , Q) be a virtually continuous game and define
by letting Q ′ (x) be the convex hull of Q(x) for each x ∈ X. As shown in the proof of Theorem 2, Γ ′ is virtually continuous and
The next result provides a characterization of invariant equilibria.
For the reverse inclusion, consider any i ∈ N . There areq, q ∈ S Q such that for
We now address the question of when E(Γ) = I(Γ). Having this equality is of interest because it implies that any selection of the payoff correspondence can be used to find an equilibrium for any other selection. A sufficient condition for having E(Γ) = I(Γ) is that Γ be strongly indeterminate in addition to being virtual continuous.
Theorem 4. Let Γ = (N, (X i ) i∈N , Q) be virtually continuous. Then the following holds:
. Indeed, as shown in the proof of Lemma 3, Q eff has a measurable graph and nonempty values, so by Castaing and Valadier (1977, Theorem III.22) that there is a sequence ⟨h k ⟩ k∈N of (Borel) measurable functions
Thus for some k ∈ N\{0} and some Borel set
and some Borel set
In either case, set
(ii) Virtual continuity, Theorem 1, and Lemma 5 combine to say that whenever
then part 1 and Theorem 3 imply that I(Γ) = E(Γ).
Example 2. If Γ = (N, (X i ) i∈N , Q) is a constant-sum endogenous sharing rule game (i.e., for some c ∈ R, ∑ i∈N r i = c for all r ∈ Q(x) and all x ∈ X) then Q = Q eff and thus Γ is strongly indeterminate. Consequently, if such a Γ is virtually continuous, then I(Γ) = E(Γ). Thus, in particular, if Γ is a two-person, constant-sum endogenous sharing rule game which satisfies the hypothesis in Example 1, then I(Γ) = E(Γ).
Remark 5. In this remark we take a brief look at quasi-concave games. Recall that a game Γ = (N, (X i ) i∈N , Q) is quasi-concave if, for each i ∈ N , X i is a convex subset of a locally convex topological vector space and there is a q ∈ S Q such that, for each
is quasi-concave. Identify, for each i ∈ N , X i with the set of Dirac measures at the points of this space. Using Bich and Laraki (2017, Theorem 3.4) 
Moreover, if Γ is virtually continuous and strongly indeterminate, then E(Γ) = I(Γ)
by Theorem 4 and, therefore, X ∩ E(Γ) = X ∩ I(Γ). In words, invariance in mixed strategies implies invariance in pure strategies. However, as it can be easily shown, the latter holds when virtually continuity is required to hold only for pure strategies, in the following sense:
Example 3. Modify the example in Section 2 by taking X 2 = [c, 1] with 0 < c < 1/2 (i.e., firm 2 has constant marginal cost c with 0 < c < 1/2), so that for each x ∈ X,
It follows by Example 1 that Γ is virtually continuous. However, E(Γ) ̸ = I(Γ).
Indeed, if q ∈ S Q is such that θ(c, c) = 1, then (δ c , δ c ) ∈ E(G q ) ⊆ E(Γ). But (δ c , δ c ) / ∈ E(G q ) if q ∈ S Q is such that θ(c, c) < 1. Thus (δ c , δ c ) / ∈ I(Γ).
This shows that virtual continuity is not enough to ensure E(Γ) = I(Γ), and thus
highlights the role of strong indeterminacy as a condition in Theorem 4. Indeed this latter condition fails at (c, c),
Example 4. The following example (whose setup is due to Simon and Zame (1990)) illustrates why our notion of virtual continuity is required to hold for all selections of the payoff correspondence, rather than just for one. 3, 4] , and for each x ∈ X,
The functionq just specified is continuous, so the requirements of virtual continuity hold forq. Also, strong indeterminacy holds; in fact Q = Q eff . But I(Γ) = ∅.
This contradiction shows that I(Γ) = ∅. Finally, note thatq 1 (x 1 , 3) < 3 whenever x 1 < 3, i.e., whenever (x 1 , 3) ∈ X 1 \D 1 . Thus the requirements of virtual continuity are not satisfied forq.
Applications

Bertrand competition with convex costs
In this section we consider a Bertrand oligopoly with convex costs. The standard formalization of Bertrand competition, according to which the firm posting the lowest price serves the entire demand, leads to difficulties in this setting. This is so because firms may prefer to tie to reduce the quantity produced. But this desire of a firm to tie is rather artificial and a consequence of the assumption that the firm posting the lowest price must serve the entire demand. In other words, the standard formalization is not appropriate for the case of convex costs; rather, it is more appropriate to allow firms to choose the quantity they want to supply. We allow for this by allowing each firm to choose a price and the maximum production level it is willing to produce. Our formalization is analogous to that of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986, Section 2. 2) where each firm has an exogenously given capacity; here, in contrast, we assume that the capacity of each firm is endogenous, i.e. it is chosen by the firm. Our formalization is also analogous to that of Maskin (1986) where firms choose both prices and quantities, and firms produce to order, i.e., produce only after the entire price profile has been observed.
As in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) There are n ∈ N firms. Each firm i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} chooses a price p i and a capacity s i , the latter being the maximum amount the firm is willing to produce. Let
To specify how the demand is allocated to firms, it is convenient to consider first the case of two firms. In this case, if one firm offers a price p lower than the price p ′ offered by the other firm, it serves the entire market up to its capacity s. A fraction
of consumers is not served and each of these consumers de-
from the firm offering the highest price. When both firms set the same price, then the demand at the common price is split by each firm up to its capacity.
Formally, the quantities produced by firms are described by the correspondence
When prices are different, these quantities are the same as in both Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and Maskin (1986) (with the proportional rationing rule in the latter).
There are, however, differences between our formalization and theirs when prices are equal. First, we allow for indeterminacy, whereas they do not. Second, we rule out the possibility that a firm produces less than its capacity when there is unfulfilled demand (i.e. ϕ i < s i and ϕ 1 + ϕ 2 < d(p 1 ) for some i is not possible); in contrast this is allowed in both Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and Maskin (1986) .
We now return to the general case of n firms. We start by defining the following
Order the elements of 
. It is straightforward to check, using induction, together with continuity of d and continuity of taking minima, that for each
Since the values taken by Φ are included in a common compact set, the fact that Φ is closed implies that Φ is uhc and takes compact values. Clearly Φ takes non-empty values.
The above specification of Φ allows firms to choose any capacity. However some choices are easily seen to be redundant. In fact, for each i ∈ N , it suffices to consider capacity choices that are solutions of the problem
Note that because c is strictly convex, a solution of this problem is unique. Let s * : P → R describe this solution as a function on P . Note that s * is continuous, with
This discussion leads to consider the following game Γ with an endogenous sharing rule. For each i ∈ N let the action set be P and define the payoff correspondence To check strong indeterminacy, fix p ∈ P n and consider any i ∈ N . Let p (l) be the element of the order
These facts together imply strong indeterminacy, because (see above) payoffs are strictly
As for virtual continuity, fix i ∈ N , p i ∈ P with p i > 0, and ε > 0. Note that
, and given any q ∈ S Q , for some numbers
and
and d, together with compactness of [0, 1], imply that there is a δ > 0 such that
As payoffs are non-decreasing on [0, s
Consequently the hypotheses of Lemma 8 are satisfied. Thus virtual continuity holds.
By Theorems 2 and 4, we conclude that
Electoral competition
We consider a location/voting model as in Duggan (2007, Section 6 ). The setting is as follows. There are 2 players i = 1, 2 (e.g. political candidates), choosing locations x 1 , x 2 , respectively, in a compact and convex subset A of R m , m > 0, with nonempty interior. When these location differ, then, for each i = 1, 2, the payoff is given by
where || · || denotes the Euclidean norm and ν is a measure on A which is absolutely continuous with respect to (m-dimensional) Lebesgue measure. The interpretation is that there is a set of individuals whose location in A is distributed according to ν and that each individual is attracted to the player located closest to him. (Note that as long as x 1 ̸ = x 2 , absolute continuity of ν with respect to Lebesgue measure implies that points a ∈ A with ∥a − x 1 ∥ = ∥a − x 2 ∥ don't matter for the payoffs of the two players.) Now if x 1 = x 2 , there is no canonical way to determine payoffs; in fact, perturbing such a situation can lead to different payoff sharings in the limit when the perturbations vanish; see the example given in Section 2.
It is therefore natural to analyze this situation using a game with an endogenous sharing rule, rather than to make an ad hoc specification of payoffs as in Duggan (2007) , where it is assumed that whenever players choose the same locations, payoffs are distributed in equal shares.
Without loss of generality, we assume that ν(A) = 1. Let S = {p ∈ R m : ∥p∥ = 1}.
For each p ∈ S and each z ∈ A, let θ(p, z) = ν({a ∈ A : pa < pz}). Note that for
) and
Proof. (i) Given z ∈ bd(A), there is a p ∈ S such that pz ≥ pa for all a ∈ A and such that z − λp ∈ A for all λ > 0 sufficiently small. Indeed, let C be the set of all p ∈ R m such that pz ≥ pa for all a ∈ A. Then C convex, with 0 ∈ C. We must have
for all a ∈ A and p ∈ C, by the separation theorem. The fact that 0 ∈ C implies that v ∈ C, and the fact that z ∈ A implies that vp ≤ 0 for all p ∈ C. But these implications contradict each other because v ̸ = 0 means vv > 0.
(ii) The map θ is continuous. To see this, suppose p k → p in S and z k → z in A.
Because ν is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, it follows that
(iii) Using (ii) we see that Q is closed. As for virtual continuity, wlog consider player 1. Suppose that x 1 = x 2 = z ∈ int(A). Let (r 1 , r 2 ) ∈ Q(x 1 , x 2 ), and let p ∈ S be such that r 1 = θ(p, z). As x 1 ∈ int(A), we have x λ = x 1 − λp ∈ A for all sufficiently small λ > 0. Now, for such λ,
and by (ii),
Choose p ∈ S with respect to z according to (i). Then, setting r 1 = θ(p, z), we have
and because z − λp ∈ A for all sufficiently small λ > 0, we can again choose x λ for player 1 to get u 1 (x λ , x 2 ) → r 1 . In view of Example 1 and Remark 1 it follows that virtual continuity is satisfied.
Obviously, the game Γ we have discussed is a constant-sum game and thus satisfies strong indeterminacy. It therefore follows from Lemma 6 and Theorems 2 and 4 that 
Consider i = 1. There is a q ∈ S Q such that q 1 (0, 0, 1) = q 1 (0, 0, −1) = 1. Let
). Then q 1 (σ) = 1, and a simple calculation shows that for each
In light of Lemma 7 in Appendix A.1, it follows that Γ is not virtually continuous.
Extension: Incomplete Information
In this section we extend our results to the case of incomplete information. Specifically, we consider incomplete information games with indeterminate outcomes, as introduced by Jackson, Simon, Swinkels, and Zame (2002), i.e., games where the assignment of payoffs to type/action profiles factors through a correspondence to some space of possible outcomes. We will present two results. The first one can be interpreted as assuming that the auctioneer knows the realizations of players' types and can use this information when implementing tie breaking rules. In Jackson and Swinkels (2005) , this case is called that of an "omniscient auctioneer." In the second one, which is a corollary of the first, we turn to the more realistic case where the auctioneer does not have any information about players' types.
A game with indeterminate outcomes is described as follows. There is a finite set The payoff correspondence Q : T × A → R N is now defined by setting
Note that Q is uhc and has nonempty and compact values.
Additional notation is as before: given i ∈ N , π i denotes the projection of R N on the ith coordinate, and we write
Following Balder (1988), we describe a mixed strategy σ i of player i by a Young measure from T i to A i , i.e., a map from T i to the space M (A i ) of probability measures
is Borel-measurable for each Borel set B in
3 As in Section 3, M i is the set of mixed strategies available for player i, now with the interpretation as a space of Young measures. Again, we write M = ∏ i∈N M i for the set of all profiles of mixed strategies.
As for payoffs, consider any σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) ∈ M . For every t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ T write σ(t) for the Borel measure on A defined by setting σ(t) = σ 1 (t 1 ) × · · · × σ n (t n ).
Then the map t → σ(t) is a Young measure from T to M (A) (to see that t → σ(t)(B)
is measurable for each B ∈ B(A), observe that this is true if B is a product of Borel subsets B i of T i , i = 1, . . . , n, and use the monotone class theorem).
4 By Neveu (1965, Proposition III.2.1) it follows that there is a uniquely determined probability measure
σ(t)(B) dλ(t) for each E ∈ B(T ) and B ∈ B(A).
Now, for any q ∈ S Q and i ∈ N , the integral ∫ 
Because, given any realization t ∈ T of possible type profiles, the payoff of player i is ∫ A q i (t, a) dσ(t)(a) (exactly as in the deterministic framework of the previous sections), we see that in the Bayesian framework considered now, the payoff of this player can be ) . Again, we use the expression q i (σ) as abbreviation.
3 In Milgrom and Weber (1985) such notion of a mixed strategy is called a behavioral strategy and, as they note, is equivalent to the notion of a distributional strategy that they consider. 4 We use B(T ) and B(A) to denote the Borel σ-algebra of T and A, respectively.
As in Section 4.1 on Bertrand competition, one may restrict players' choices of strategies so as that these have certain dominance properties (see Example 6 below).
This can be done by specifying, for each i ∈ N , an uhc correspondence
with non-empty closed values, and considering only strategy profiles σ such that for
satisfying this restriction, and let W = ∏ i∈N W i . Given such correspondences Φ i , it might be of interest to get an invariance result in W . For this the following notion of virtual continuity is appropriate (see Example 6).
Writing Φ for the list (Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n ), we say that a game is Φ-virtually continuous if
Finally, given Φ, some generality can be gained by relaxing strong indeterminacy into the requirement that there be a Borel set K ⊆ T × A such that both τ σ (K) = 0 for each σ ∈ W and #(π i • Q eff (t, a)) > 1 for each i ∈ N and each (t, a) ∈ D i \ K (see Example 6). We will call this notion Φ-strong indeterminacy.
λ, Θ) be a game with indeterminate outcomes. Suppose that Γ is Φ-virtually continuous and Φ-strongly indeterminate. Then
E(Γ) ∩ W = I(Γ) ∩ W ̸ = ∅.
Proof. The proof of the equality E(Γ)∩W = I(Γ)∩W (points (a)-(e) below) amounts,
in essence, to a reinterpretation of the proofs of Lemma 5 and Theorems 1, 3, and 4, with T × A in place of X; note that for the arguments in the proofs of those results it does not matter whether or not the τ σ 's appearing there are product measures.
(a) For each q ∈ S Q and i ∈ N , define value functions v q i : M → R in the same way as in Section 3. Then, provided that σ ∈ W , Φ-virtual continuity implies that
′ ∈ S Q and any i ∈ N . This follows as in the proof of Lemma 5, just replace M i by W i in the definition of the set H there. Consequently, 
if ε is small enough. But this contradicts the fact thatσ is a Nash equilibrium ofḠ and we conclude thatσ ∈ E(Γ) ∩ W . Now by Reny (1999, Theorem 3.1),Ḡ has a Nash equilibrium ifḠ is quasi-concave, payoff secure, and σ → ∑ i∈Nq i (σ) is usc on W . Quasi-concavity is clear. The other facts are established in what follows.
(g) Give W = ∏ i∈N W i the product topology defined from the W i 's. Let W be the set of all Young measures from T to M (A). Take λ as control measure for W and give W the corresponding narrow topology for Young measures. As noted above,
We may therefore define a map f : W → W by setting
It follows from Lemmata 12 and 13 in Appendix A.3 that f is continuous. Now let ρ : T × A → R be a bounded and usc. By Balder (1988, Theorem 2.2), the map
(h) As noted above, (t, a) → ∑ i∈Nq i (t, a) is bounded and usc. Consequently, in view of (g), the map
is usc on W .
(i) Combining Lemmata 12-14 in Appendix A.3 shows that if i ∈ N , µ i ∈ W i , and
. From this and the argument in the proof of Lemma 9 we can see thatḠ is payoff secure.
Theorem 5 implies an invariance and existence result for selections of the payoff correspondence which are determined by selections of the outcome correspondence, i.e., for elements q of S Q which can be written in the form q(t, a) = u(t, a, θ(a)) for some measurable selection θ of Θ. Write S * Q for the set of all q ∈ S Q which can be written in this form. Let E We remark that Theorem 6 is important because the type of a player may be his own private information, and because with selections of the payoff correspondence that are obtained via selections of the outcome correspondence no issues concerning type revelation arise.
We illustrate Theorem 5 with two examples. In both of them the next theorem, which provides a way to show that virtual continuity holds in a wide class of games with indeterminate outcomes, is used. 
Suppose the following:
(1) A i is convex and has a non-empty interior for each i ∈ N .
(2) For each q ∈ S Q , i ∈ N , and σ 
Then Γ is Φ-virtually continuous.
Remark 8. This remark clarifies what is intended with condition (4)(i). Ignoring this condition momentarily, the restriction that (4) imposes is the requirement that
(ii)-(iv) be satisfied at the same time as (v). Condition (4)(i) helps in this regard as it allows to reduce the set of points at which conditions (ii)-(v) need hold. Note, in particular, that (i) does not impose any restriction in addition to those imposed by (ii)-
Proof of Theorem 7. Without loss of generality, consider i = 1. Fix any q ∈ S Q , σ ∈ M 1 × W −1 , and ε > 0. Use (2) and Lemma 11 to find a h ′ ∈ S Φ 1 such that
We claim that for each k ∈ N \ {0} there is a g k ∈ S Φ 1 such that
To see this, let λ
−1 be the product measure on T −1 defined from the measures λ 2 , . . . , λ n and let τ
−1 be the uniquely determined probability measure on
−1 (T −1 × ∆ 1,a 1 ) = 0} is a dense G δ -set, writing ∆ 1,a 1 for the section of ∆ 1 at a 1 . Indeed, for each i ∈ N\{1} and each
Because A 1 is convex and has non-empty interior, the set {a 1 ∈ A 1 : a 1,h ′ = r} is closed and nowhere dense in A 1 for each r ∈ R, and the claim about E follows by Baire's category theorem.
Then F k has a measurable graph. As (t 1 , h(t 1 )) ∈ graph(Φ 1 ) and h(t 1 ) ∈ f 1 (graph(Φ 1 )) for each t 1 ∈ T 1 \C 1 , it follows by (4)(iv) and the properties of E that F k has non-empty values. Consequently, by Castaing and Valadier (1977, Theorem III.22, p. 74) , F k has a universally measurable selection g
Choosing a suitable extension to all of T 1 , and making modifications on a λ 1 -negligible set, if necessary, we obtain a g k ∈ S Φ 1 such that (a) and (c) hold.
As for (b), observe that, for each
t ∈ T , hence also for λ-a.e. t ∈ T , because λ is absolutely continuous with respect to
and thus (3) implies (b).
As the countable union of null sets is a null set, there must be a λ-null set
Using Fubini's theorem and the fact that the countable union of null sets is a null set, we see that for
Combining this with (c), (4)((iv)), and
we see that
or, in other words,
Since this is true for λ-a.e. ∈ T , we now see, again using Fatou's lemma, that
Thus, as q ∈ S Q , σ ∈ M 1 ×W −1 , and ε > 0 are arbitrary, the requirements of Φ-virtual continuity are satisfied for player 1. As the consideration of player 1 does not imply any loss of generality, Γ is Φ-virtually continuous.
As a first application of Theorem 5, we consider a general contest with incomplete information.
Example 5. Consider the following game with indeterminate outcomes which models a contest as formalized in Moldovanu and Sela (2001) . There are n contestants i = 1, . . . , n who compete for one of n prizes with values
The allocation of prizes is determined by the contestants' effort. For example, contestant can be firms investing in R&D (their "effort") and prizes be their share of total demand. Contestants simultaneously choose an effort level. Each contestant suffers a disutility c(t i , a i ) from his own effort a i , where t i ∈T denotes his ability,T is a nonempty compact subset of R + , and c :T × R + → R + is continuous and satisfies c(t i , 0) = 0 for each t i ∈T . Abilities are drawn according to a probability measure λ onT n , which is absolutely continuous with respect to the product of its marginals, and each contestant's ability is his own private information. We assume that there isā > 0 such that V 1 < c(t,ā) for each t ∈T . 5 The assumption that the number of prizes equals the number of contestants is without loss of generality. Indeed, the case where there are p < n prizes, which is allowed in Moldovanu and Sela (2001) , is identified with V j = 0 for all j = p + 1, . . . , n. 6 Moldovanu and Sela (2001) 
where γ : R + → R + is strictly increasing and differentiable and satisfies γ(0) = 0. The existence of a then follows when γ is linear or convex. Note also that, unlike Moldovanu and Sela (2001), we do not assume that types are independent with a continuous and strictly positive density.
When all contestants choose different effort levels, then the first prize goes to the player with the highest effort, the second prize goes to the player with the second highest effort and so on. In case of ties in effort levels, randomization is used to determined the allocation of prizes. For example, if players 1, 2 and 4 choose the highest effort level, then the first three prizes are randomly allocated to players 1, 2 and 4. We let H be the set of allocations, i.e.
the set of 1-1 functions from N (players) to N (prizes). The outcome space Ω is the set of probability measures on H. Some notation is needed to define the outcome correspondence. Given a ∈ A, order the elements of the set {a 1 , . . . , a n } so that
a }. Given a ∈ A, the set of feasible allocations is denoted by H(a) and consists of those h ∈ H with the property that, for
a . We then define Θ : A → Ω in this context by setting, for each a ∈ A,
The payoff of contestant i ∈ N equals the expected value of the prize received minus his disutility of effort; thus contestant i's payoff function
for each t ∈ T , a ∈ A, and ω ∈ Θ(a). This implies easily that the game Γ just defined is strongly indeterminate.
We next show that Γ is virtually continuous by using Theorem 7 with Φ i (t i ) = A i for each i ∈ N and t i ∈ T i (so that W i = M i ). It is clear that conditions (1)-(3) in Theorem 7 hold. As for condition (4), fix i ∈ N and ε > 0.
Let η ∈ (0,ā) be such that V 1 < c(t, a) for each a >ā − η, and define f i by setting,
t ∈T , and define Λ i by setting
Clearly Λ i has a measurable graph and (ii)-(iv) of condition (4) in Theorem 7 are satisfied. As for (v) of that condition, let t i ∈ T i ,
as desired.
By Theorems 5 we conclude that E(Γ)
The next theorem provides a way to see that strong indeterminacy holds in a wide class of games with indeterminate outcomes. 
Suppose the following:
Then Γ is Φ-strongly indeterminate.
Proof. For each i, j ∈ N , i ̸ = j, and each 0 ≤ h, h ′ ≤ ℓ, let
We therefore need to show that τ σ (K) = 0 whenever σ ∈ W . Thus fix any σ ∈ W . By the definition of W ,
Since a finite union of null sets is a null set, it follows that τ σ (K) = 0. 
The payoff functions u i : T × A × Ω → R are then given by
is the set of prices above marginal cost, which we assume to be nonempty.
To see that the game Γ just defined is virtually continuous, we check that the hypotheses of Theorem 7 are satisfied. Clearly conditions (1) and (3) of that theorem are satisfied. As for condition (2), without loss of generality consider player 1. Fix q ∈ S Q and σ ∈ M . By Lemma 11 there is a measurable map g :
Thus condition (2) of Theorem 7 holds. To see that condition (4) of that theorem holds, fix ε > 0 and i ∈ N . Let η > 0 be such that |d(a
Then f i and Λ i satisfy the requirements in (4) of Theorem 7 for the given i and ε. As i ∈ N and ε > 0 are arbitrary, (4) of Theorem 7 is satisfied.
Thus, by Theorem 7, Γ is Φ-virtually continuous. For each i ∈ N , define a map
Using Theorem 8, with ℓ = 1 and f i,1 = h i for each i ∈ N , we see that Γ is Φ-strongly indeterminate. Now by Theorem 5 we can
Remark 9. It is straightforward to generalize the above example to the case of more than one commodity by using the full generality of Theorem 7 with ℓ > 1. It is also interesting to contrast the conclusion of the above Bertrand example with Example 3. In both examples, the two firms have asymmetric costs with probability one; however, invariance of the equilibrium set holds in Example 6 but not in Example 3. The difference is that the possible types of each firm are distributed atomlessly in Example 6, so that Theorem 8 applies to yield strong indeterminacy, which is not the case in the other example.
Lemma 7 implies that virtual continuity in mixed strategies implies virtual continuity in pure strategies (see Remark 5 for the definition of the latter). However, the converse does not hold, as the following example shows.
Example 7. Suppose N = {1, 2} and X 1 = X 2 = [0, 1]. Define a correspondence 
Then virtual continuity holds.
Proof. To see this, consider any q ∈ S Q , σ ∈ M , ε > 0, and i ∈ N . Without loss of generality, take i = 1 and let x 1 ∈ A be such that
To see this, first observe that the set E = {a 1 ∈ A : τ σ −1 (∆ 1,a 1 ) = 0} is dense, writing ∆ 1,a 1 for the section of ∆ 1 at a 1 . Indeed, for each i ∈ N \ {1}, the set of 
(ii) Using Fubini's theorem and the fact that the countable union of null sets is a null set, we see from (b) that for τ σ −1 -a.e.
Hence, from (2)(ii), and because (x 1 , x −1 ) is a continuity point of q 1 whenever (x 1 , x −1 ) / ∈ D 1 , we must have
by Fatou's lemma. Thus, by (i)(a), and as ε > 0 is arbitrary, the requirements of virtual continuity are satisfied for player 1.
Returning to the definition of virtual continuity, it would of course be more intuitive, and for typical applications probably also sufficient (this is actually the case for the applications we will consider in this paper), to require τ
Example 8. Let N = {1, 2}, and X 1 = X 2 = [0, 1]. Define a correspondence
Then Q is uhc with non-empty compact values, and
Pick any q ∈ S Q . Of course, the requirements of virtual continuity are satisfied for
from which we can see that the requirements of virtual continuity are satisfied for
Remark 10. Example 8 shows, in particular, that our definition of virtual continuity allows the sets D i to be quite large. In fact, in that example, D 1 has a non-empty interior.
Lemma 9. Give M the narrow topology. Then virtual continuity implies that each
q ∈ S Q is mixed strategy payoff secure, i.e., for all σ ∈ M , i ∈ N , and ε > 0 there is
B is as in the proof of Lemma 4. By virtual continuity there is a µ i ∈ M i such that
We need to show that whenever
and use Skorokhod's theorem to find measurable maps h and
a.e. on F . Consequently
Now, by the choice of B, we have ∫
. Putting all these together, proves the claim. 
A.2 Young measures
In this section we establish a result on Young measures that is needed for our main results. −1 (t −1 ) for the product measure on A −1 defined from the measures σ 2 (t 2 ), . . . , σ n (t n ). Write λ otherwise, has a measurable graph. Clearly F (t 1 ) ̸ = ∅ for all t 1 ∈ T 1 . Using Castaing and Valadier (1977, III.22, p. 74) , there is a universally measurable map g ′ such that g ′ (t 1 ) ∈ F (t 1 ) for all t 1 ∈ T 1 . Observe that the set { t 1 ∈ T 1 : ∫ Thus the lemma is true whenever q is non-negative. But this implies that the lemma is true for any bounded q, by the fact that if f : T × A → R is constant-valued, then
A.3 Spaces of Young measures
Fix a probability space (T, Σ, ν) and a Polish space X, and let R denote the set of all Young measures from T to X.
A Carathéodory integrand on T × X, with control measure ν, is a measurable function q : T × X → R such that q(t, ·) is continuous for each t ∈ T and such that for some ν-integrable θ q : T → R + , sup{|q(t, x)| : x ∈ X} ≤ θ q (t) for each t ∈ T . Write If κ : T → X is a correspondence, then R κ denotes the subset of R defined by setting R κ = {γ ∈ R : supp(γ(t)) ⊆ κ(t) for almost all t ∈ T }.
The following theorem gathers several properties of the space R κ (see Carmona and Podczeck (2014, Theorem 10) for a proof). Now for each i = 1, . . . , n, let (T i , Σ i , λ i ) be a probability measure, X i a Polish space, and write R i for the set of all Young measures from T i to X i . Set X = ∏ n i=1 X i , T = ∏ n i=1 T i , and Σ = ⊗ n i=1 Σ i . Let R be the set of all Young measures from T to X, and g : ∏ i∈N R i → R the map defined by setting g(σ 1 , . . . σ n )(t) = σ 1 (t 1 ) × · · · × σ n (t n ), t ∈ T, for all (σ 1 , . . . σ n ) ∈ ∏ i∈N R i . Write λ (×) for the product measure defined from the measures λ i , i = 1, . . . , n, and let λ be any probability measure on (T, Σ). Lemma 12. The map g is continuous.
